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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S DE FACTO 
PHYSICAL BARRIER REQUIREMENT: A 
MOVEMENT TOWARD A TRUE TOTALITY OF 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST AFTER UNITED 
STATES V. CARLOSS* 
INTRODUCTION 
The phrase “no trespassing” conveys a simple message: one may 
not enter someone else’s property without an invitation or the legal 
authority to do so. Homeowners often use no trespassing signs to 
signal that visitors are unwelcome on their property. In circumstances 
involving police, however, most courts have held that no trespassing 
signs alone are ineffective in revoking the customary license police 
are presumed to have.1 Instead, the most important consideration for 
most courts is the existence of a barrier physically preventing police 
from entering the premises.2 In essence, most courts have created a de 
facto requirement that a barrier exist between the homeowner and 
the police to maintain the homeowner’s Fourth Amendment rights.3 
This de facto requirement leads courts to apply a more stringent 
standard than is constitutionally required for homeowners.4 
Consequently, courts have made it more difficult for homeowners to 
keep police away from their homes.5 
The facts of a recent Tenth Circuit case are illustrative of a 
scenario in which a sign alone was found to be ineffective in revoking 
 
 *  © 2018 Philip D. Mayer. 
 1. See, e.g., United States v. Bearden, 780 F.3d 887, 893–94 (8th Cir. 2015) 
(upholding knock and talk despite no trespassing sign on the driveway gate); United States 
v. Holmes, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1252, 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (“[I]n the absence of another 
barrier (such as a fence and gate), ‘No Trespassing’ signs do not, in and of themselves, 
withdraw the implied consent to conduct a knock and talk.”); United States v. Jones, No. 
4:13cr00011-003, 2013 WL 4678229, at *9 (W.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2013) (holding that “the 
existence and volume of ‘No Trespassing’ signs” neither revoked the officers’ implied 
license to approach the house, nor expanded the defendant’s rights under the Fourth 
Amendment); United States v. Schultz, No. 13-20023, 2013 WL 2352742, at *5 (E.D. Mich. 
May 29, 2013) (reasoning that the officers had a lawful right to enter onto the defendant’s 
property, despite the presence of no trespassing signs, to “engage in investigation-related 
conversation”). 
 2. See Holmes, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1265. 
 3. See infra Section II.C. 
 4. See infra Section II.C. 
 5. See infra Section II.C. 
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a law enforcement officer’s license to be on an individual’s property. 
In United States v. Carloss,6 agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) were investigating Ralph Carloss for 
violations of weapons and drug laws.7 In an attempt to talk to Carloss, 
the agents approached his residence and knocked on the door.8 This 
practice, often depicted in popular culture and crime dramas, is 
known as a “knock and talk.”9 As they approached the home, the 
ATF agents bypassed multiple no trespassing signs that lined the 
property.10 Additionally, there was a no trespassing sign posted on the 
front door of the house.11 Carloss came out of the house, briefly 
talked to the agents, and started to return to the house.12 The agents 
then asked if they could accompany him inside, to which Carloss 
agreed.13 In the house, the officers saw drug paraphernalia and drug 
residue in plain view.14 After leaving the house without searching, the 
officers used their observations to obtain a search warrant and search 
the house.15 They found multiple meth labs and a loaded shotgun, 
among other items, leading to the prosecution of Carloss for weapons 
and drug offenses.16 
This example—as satisfying as it may be for law enforcement—is 
troubling for commentators and academics concerned with the 
preservation of civil liberties. In order to conduct a knock and talk, 
police rely on a customary license, often referred to as an implied 
license, for visitors to approach a home.17 The Supreme Court has 
held that police do not have special powers to approach homes; 
instead, officers are treated as ordinary members of the public in this 
respect.18 However, courts have not strictly adhered to this holding, 
effectively requiring the presence of a physical barrier to revoke this 
 
 6. 818 F.3d 988 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 7. Id. at 990. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1423 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 10. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 990 (noting that these signs stated “Private Property No 
Trespassing”). 
 11. Id. (noting that this sign stated “Posted Private Property Hunting, Fishing, 
Trapping or Trespassing for Any Purpose Is Strictly Forbidden Violators Will Be 
Prosecuted”). 
 12. Id. at 991. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–17 (2013). 
 18. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011) (“When law enforcement officers who 
are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen 
might do.”). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 546 (2018) 
548 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
license for law enforcement officers.19 In the above example, the 
homeowner sought to revoke this license by placing several no 
trespassing signs conspicuously around the property, thus attempting 
to prevent the police from using the implied license to enter the 
curtilage. Consequently, the homeowner could argue that the police 
were trespassing when they obtained the justification for the 
subsequent search. 
Most courts, however, would disagree with the homeowner. 
Since the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Florida v. Jardines,20 
courts have made it more difficult to revoke an officer’s implied 
license.21 As briefly noted above, courts have essentially established a 
de facto requirement that there be some sort of physical barrier 
between the homeowner and the police. This de facto barrier 
requirement renders signage virtually useless in the absence of such a 
barrier. 
Historically, physical barriers have not been required to revoke 
the customary license.22 Instead, the concept of actual notice—
manifested through physical barriers, posted signs, or actions from the 
homeowner—had been the primary consideration.23 Though physical 
barriers, such as walls and fences, are perhaps the clearest evidence 
that the customary license has been revoked, they have not 
historically been dispositive for establishing a common law trespass.24 
Moreover, the focus on actual barriers can create bad policy 
outcomes. Citizens with few means to erect barriers may be 
disadvantaged relative to wealthier citizens.25 Without fences or walls, 
 
 19. See, e.g., Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1000 (noting that a fence and gate would likely have 
been sufficient to revoke the license); State v. Smith, __ N.C. App. __, __, 783 S.E.2d 504, 
510 (2016) (“Courts in other jurisdictions have ruled that the implied invitation to 
approach was revoked by homeowners who sought refuge behind a large, imposing fence 
and made clear by either verbal or posted instructions that visitors were not welcome.”); 
State v. Christensen, 517 S.W.3d 60, 77 (Tenn. 2017) (“[W]hile a fence and a closed gate 
that physically block access to the front door of a house, in some instances, may be 
sufficient to revoke the implied license to enter the curtilage of a residence, mere 
ambiguous signage and unkemptness are not.”). 
 20. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
 21. See infra notes 128–40 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 128–40 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
 25. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy in the Criminal Context: The Distribution of Fourth 
Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1267 (1999) (“[P]rivacy can be bought, 
so that people who have money have more of it than people who don’t. It follows that 
people who have money have more Fourth Amendment protection than people who 
don’t.”). Though this article was written in a Katz-only world, see infra text accompanying 
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low-income homeowners may be subject to more police interactions 
on their property, which can result in invasive, full-fledged searches.26 
Though this inequity is not foreign to Fourth Amendment doctrine,27 
it can be remedied by applying a true totality of the circumstances test 
in analyzing the revocation of implied licenses.  
It remains to be seen, however, whether courts will be receptive 
to such an adjustment. Most notably, in 2016, the Tenth Circuit kept 
the door open for courts to shift away from the de facto barrier 
requirement. In its decision in Carloss, the majority allowed for the 
possibility that signage alone could, under the right circumstances, 
revoke the customary license.28 Though the Tenth Circuit ultimately 
ruled against the defendant,29 the court’s decision—and 
 
note 55, the basic point remains applicable: wealthier individuals have more tools at their 
disposal to create privacy than less wealthy individuals. 
 26. See Jamesa J. Drake, Knock and Talk No More, 67 ME. L. REV. 25, 26 (2014) 
(arguing that knock and talks allow police officers to “circumvent the warrant 
requirement”); infra text accompanying notes 103–04. 
 27. The Katz reasonable expectations test, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), has been criticized by some academics as favoring those 
with more resources. See Kami C. Simmons, Future of the Fourth Amendment: The 
Problem with Privacy, Poverty and Policing, 14 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & 
CLASS 240, 247–52 (2014) (“Low-wage workers and the poor generally enjoy reduced 
privacy expectations because of the structures where they reside	.	.	.	.”). 
 28. Though the majority indicated that a single “no trespassing” sign would not 
revoke the implied license, it kept open the possibility that, under different circumstances, 
a sign might “convey to an objective officer, or member of the public, that he cannot go to 
the front door and knock.” See United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 995 (10th Cir. 2016). 
Then-Judge Gorsuch’s dissent fairly characterizes the majority opinion: 
The sole controlling opinion in this case doesn’t suggest that No Trespassing signs 
are categorically insufficient to revoke the implied license but suggests only that 
homeowners should be more punctilious with their choice and placement of signs 
than the homeowner here. Indeed, I understand the majority opinion as strongly 
implying that No Trespassing signs will do their job so long as they (1) are placed 
visibly on the curtilage itself and (2) don’t contain surplus language about hunting 
and trapping. 
 Id. at 1014 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). It stands to reason that in different circumstances, 
perhaps with more specificity from the signage, revocation would be effective. 
Interestingly, two professors have begun selling more specific signage in an attempt to 
allow homeowners to effectively revoke the license. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & 
Stephen E. Henderson, LAWn Signs: A Fourth Amendment for Constitutional 
Curmudgeons, 13 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 487, 491–95 (2016). 
 29. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 999. By ruling against the defendant, the Tenth Circuit 
extended the impressive winning-streak for the government in cases in which the 
homeowner does not have a barrier. The Tenth Circuit’s decision offers hope for a 
refocusing of the test, but that remains to be seen. See infra notes 179–85 and 
accompanying text. The concurrence in Carloss strongly suggested that the de facto 
barrier requirement should apply. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1002 (Tymkovich, J., concurring). 
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accompanying dissent—could allow other courts to more faithfully 
consider the totality of the circumstances. 
Perhaps equally important, Carloss also produced a potentially 
influential dissenting opinion. Then-circuit Judge, and now-Supreme 
Court Justice, Gorsuch wrote a lengthy opinion in which he reasoned 
that signage alone could revoke the customary license.30 He argued 
that the notion of a barrier requirement was not faithful to the 
application of common law trespass doctrine.31 Then-Judge Gorsuch’s 
dissent provides lower courts with ammunition to shift the inquiry 
away from physical barriers and toward a true totality of the 
circumstances test.32 
Through the lens of the Tenth Circuit’s decision, this Recent 
Development proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the facts of 
Carloss, discusses the foundation of the implied license analysis, and 
examines the power the government wields through investigative 
visits by law enforcement officers. Part II highlights the real-world 
implications of the dynamic between investigative visits and the 
revocation of the implied license. Finally, Part III argues that courts 
should give more weight to signage, while forecasting the influence 
that Carloss could have over lower courts and providing a potential 
solution. 
 I.  IMPLIED LICENSE FOUNDATIONS 
A. The Protection of Curtilage as a Basis for Implied Licenses 
At its core, the Fourth Amendment protects “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects” from unreasonable searches and seizures.33 Most 
importantly for this analysis, the term “houses” is specifically listed as 
 
 30. See id. at 1003–14 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. at 1011 (“[T]he common law rule of decision at the time of the founding and its 
many applications, then and now, suggest[ed] that posted notice can suffice to warn off 
‘reasonable’ visitors. The Fourth Amendment is, after all, supposed to protect the people 
at least as much now as it did when adopted, its ancient protections still in force whatever 
our current intuitions or preferences might be.”). 
 32. Though the majority opinion in Carloss is controlling in the Tenth Circuit, other 
circuits may be influenced by then-Judge Gorsuch’s opinion. As one scholar notes, 
dissenting opinions can provide a clue as to where the law will go in the future. See 
Michael Boudin, Friendly, J., Dissenting, 61 DUKE L.J. 881, 897 (2012) (“[T]he dissents 
regarded as great are often deemed so in part because they were prophetic and ultimately 
prevailed in later cases. The roll-call is familiar—from Justice Curtis in Dred Scott, to the 
first Justice Harlan in Plessy, to Justice Holmes in Gitlow and Lochner, to Justice Brandeis 
in Olmstead, to Justice Jackson in Korematsu.”). 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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a protected space.34 Consequently, the home is afforded the fullest 
protection of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, Justice Scalia noted 
that in the context of the Fourth Amendment, “the home is first 
among equals”35 and that “[a]t the Amendment’s ‘very core’ stands 
‘the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free 
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.’”36 
The Fourth Amendment protections afforded to the home also 
apply to a limited area outside of the actual house. This area, known 
as curtilage, is the area “immediately surrounding and associated with 
the home.”37 As Justice Scalia noted in Jardines, the “principle [of 
curtilage] has ancient and durable roots.”38 Indeed, William 
Blackstone recognized that all the “branches and appurtenants” of a 
home are protected if “within the curtilage or homestall.”39 This view 
largely rests on the principle set forth in the historic English case 
Entick v. Carrington,40 which stated that “our law holds the property 
of every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his 
neighbour’s close without his leave.”41 
In the United States, the Supreme Court has largely adopted 
Blackstone’s traditional view.42 Though the Supreme Court has 
limited the type of land qualifying as curtilage,43 it has recognized that 
 
 34. In Florida v. Jardines, Justice Scalia suggested it is significant that the Fourth 
Amendment does not enumerate “real property” generally, but instead merely lists 
“houses.” 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013). This line of thought echoes the rationale set forth 
in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) that “the term ‘effects’ is less inclusive than 
‘property’ and cannot be said to encompass open fields.” Id. at 177 
 35. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. 
 36. Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
 37. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. In order to determine if an area can be considered 
curtilage, courts conduct a very fact-specific inquiry. In United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 301 
(1987), the Supreme Court enumerated several factors which may aid this determination. 
Id. at 301. These factors, commonly referred to as the Dunn factors, are: (1) “the 
proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home”; (2) “whether the area is 
included within an enclosure surrounding the home”; (3) “the nature of the uses to which 
the area is put”; and (4) “the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from 
observation by people passing by.” Id. The Dunn factors are not designed to be applied 
mechanically but instead to be “useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given 
case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration.” Id. 
 38. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. 
 39. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *225. 
 40. (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (KB). 
 41. Id. at 817. 
 42. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212–13 (1986) (“The history and genesis of 
the curtilage doctrine are instructive.”); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180–81 (relying on 
Blackstone’s definition of curtilage). 
 43. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300–01, 301 n.4 (1987) (“[T]he primary 
focus is whether the area in question harbors those intimate activities associated with 
domestic life and the privacies of the home.”). 
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curtilage is afforded robust protection.44 Decisions throughout the 
twentieth century consistently recognized that curtilage is protected 
to the fullest extent of the Fourth Amendment.45 It is viewed as a 
“constitutionally protected extension” of the home46 and is 
considered “part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.”47 
This robust Fourth Amendment protection for curtilage stems 
from its close connection to the home. The Supreme Court has 
recognized the area immediately surrounding the house to be 
“intimately linked” to the home.48 By invading the curtilage of a 
homeowner, law enforcement officers disturb “intimate activity 
associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of 
life.’”49 
This protection ensures that a homeowner’s curtilage is free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.50 Generally, law enforcement 
 
 44. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414–15 (2013).  
 45. The 1928 landmark opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)—
which has since been replaced by Katz and Jardines—explicitly referenced curtilage; in the 
context of a home, only “an actual physical invasion of [a] house or curtilage” may 
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 466. Subsequent cases have 
reinforced the notion that the curtilage is protected to the fullest extent of the Fourth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300–01; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213; Oliver, 466 U.S. 
at 180. 
 46. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415. 
 47. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. 
 48. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (noting this linkage is due to both the land’s physical 
proximity to the house as well as widespread societal notions of privacy around the home). 
 49. Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
 50. Protections for curtilage can be contrasted with the level of protection afforded to 
other areas of a homeowner’s property. Areas of the property that are not immediately 
surrounding the home—or are otherwise not found to satisfy the legal definition of 
curtilage—are typically considered to be “open fields.” See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 304–05. This 
determination is the result of a very fact-intensive inquiry and application of the Dunn 
framework. See supra note 37. Open fields need neither be open nor be an actual field; 
they “may include any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage.” See 
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n.11. Since this area is not intimately associated with the home—or 
anything else covered by the Fourth Amendment—courts have found that open fields are 
not constitutionally protected areas. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012) 
(“Quite simply, an open field, unlike the curtilage of a home .	.	. is not one of those 
protected areas enumerated in the Fourth Amendment.”); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 176–77 
(“[T]he government’s intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those ‘unreasonable 
searches’ proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment.”). In other words, police 
officers generally do not need a warrant to search an open field. A homeowner may still 
assert that the police committed a Fourth Amendment violation; however in that instance, 
homeowners must rely on the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test. Infra text 
accompanying note 55. 
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officers may not conduct a search of the curtilage without a warrant.51 
Although a thorough summary of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
is too involved for this Recent Development, an abbreviated (and 
simplified) overview is helpful to understand the broad landscape. 
Law enforcement officers may invade a homeowner’s curtilage to 
conduct a warrantless search in limited circumstances. For example, a 
homeowner or occupant may consent to a search by law enforcement, 
which eliminates the need for a search warrant.52 Absent a warrant or 
an exception to the warrant requirement, the Fourth Amendment 
proscribes searches of the curtilage by law enforcement officers.53 
For constitutionally protected areas—including curtilage—the 
Supreme Court relies on two different analyses to determine whether 
a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred. First, the test 
established in Katz v. United States,54 depends on whether police have 
violated expectations of privacy. The Katz test requires that “a person 
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and .	.	. 
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”55 Neither property rights nor physical intrusions have 
direct bearing on this analysis.56 Instead, the analysis turns on these 
expectations. 
From the adoption of the Katz test in the 1960s until recently, 
courts have held that—for Fourth Amendment purposes—no 
trespassing signs, alone, are insufficient to preclude police intrusion as 
a “search.”57 These decisions were made despite the fact that the signs 
 
 51. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 (“[C]urtilage	.	.	. warrants the Fourth Amendment 
protections that attach to the home.”). 
 52. See, e.g., 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §	3.10(a) (4th ed. 
2004) (“[A]n effort is [usually] made to obtain consent where probable cause is lacking 
and no warrant could be obtained.”). 
 53. If a violation occurs, suppression of evidence in a criminal prosecution may be an 
appropriate remedy. A victim of a Fourth Amendment violation may also bring a civil 
action. 42 U.S.C. §	1983 (2012). It is also important to note that law enforcement officers 
may observe curtilage without a warrant in some circumstances. For example, in Ciraolo, 
the Supreme Court found that unaided observation of curtilage from an altitude of 1,000 
feet was reasonable and therefore was not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 476 U.S. 
at 215. 
 54. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 55. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 56. Of course, property rights in regards to one’s home and curtilage do indirectly 
affect the analysis. See 1 DAVID S. RUDSTEIN ET AL., CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§	2.03(a) (2013) (ebook) (“Although the existence of a property right is relevant in 
determining whether an expectation of privacy is ‘legitimate,’ it is not always sufficient. 
For example, the law of trespass does not necessarily define the limits of the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
 57. Jones v. State, 943 A.2d 1, 12 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (“[W]e note that courts 
have been very consistent in concluding that no trespassing signs, in and of themselves, do 
96 N.C. L. REV. 546 (2018) 
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clearly manifested a subjective expectation of privacy by the 
homeowner. However, in most circumstances, courts were not 
persuaded that this expectation was “reasonable.”58 In effect, posting 
a no trespassing sign could not ward off the police. 
In contrast to the Katz analysis, Justice Scalia articulated a 
property-based analysis in United States v. Jones,59 focusing on 
property rights and physical intrusions. In Jones, the Supreme Court 
held that a search has occurred when evidence is obtained while 
physically intruding upon property protected by the Fourth 
Amendment property.60 This test is known by some scholars as the 
“trespass test.”61 
The trespass analysis is triggered when a physical intrusion takes 
place.62 The facts in Jones illustrate this point quite well. Without a 
warrant, law enforcement officers installed a GPS tracking device to 
the undercarriage of Mr. Jones’s vehicle, which was parked in a public 
parking lot.63 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that this was 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.64 Applying the trespass test, 
Justice Scalia held that “[b]y attaching the device to the [vehicle], 
 
not make a police officer’s entry on property unlawful. The presence of no trespassing 
signs may be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances, however.”). 
 58. See Vanessa Rownaghi, Comment, Driving into Unreasonableness: The Driveway, 
the Curtilage, and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 1165, 1184–85 (2003) (“[M]ost courts refuse to accept the presence of these signs as 
indicative of intent.”). 
 59. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 60. See id. at 404 (holding that the officers’ installation of a GPS tracking device on 
the defendant’s vehicle, an effect, constituted a search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment). The Court emphasized the historical importance of property rights in 
search and seizure analysis. See id. at 404–05 (“It is important to be clear about what 
occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied private property for the 
purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would 
have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it 
was adopted.”). Similarly, Justice Scalia reasoned in Jardines that the Court need not 
decide whether the police investigation violated a reasonable expectation of privacy under 
Katz, stating “[t]hat the officers learned what they learned only by physically intruding on 
Jardines’ property to gather evidence is enough to establish that a search occurred.” 
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013). 
 61. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, What is the State of the Jones Trespass Test After Florida v. 
Jardines?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 27, 2013, 2:56 AM), http://volokh.com/2013/03/27
/what-is-the-state-of-the-jones-trespass-test-after-florida-v-jardines/ [https://perma.cc/NQ9N-
DVBX] (examining the “trespass test” applied in Jones). 
 62. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (“Situations .	.	. without trespass would remain subject 
to Katz analysis.”). The Katz and trespass tests are not mutually exclusive. Id. at 409 
(“[T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, 
the common-law trespassory test.”). 
 63. Id. at 403. 
 64. Id. at 404, 413. 
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officers encroached on a protected area.”65 This trespass upon a 
constitutionally protected “effect” constituted a warrantless search.66  
When triggered, the trespass test takes precedence over the Katz 
test. In Jones, for example, an inquiry into the reasonableness of 
Jones’s expectations of privacy—the essential part of the Katz test—
was considered unnecessary because a physical intrusion of a 
constitutionally protected space occurred.67 Since the facts in implied-
license cases involve physical intrusions, the trespass analysis is the 
relevant inquiry. Thus, in at least that instance, it has effectively 
replaced the Katz test,68 despite Justice Scalia’s protestations that 
Katz merely “added to, not substituted for” the trespass test.69 Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that the Katz test “is 
unnecessary to consider when the government gains evidence by 
physically intruding on constitutionally protected areas.”70 
Consequently, the outcome in Carloss, as well as most other 
implied license cases, turned on whether the police officers were 
trespassing on the homeowner’s curtilage.71 Pursuant to the trespass 
analysis, if the officers did not have a warrant and were indeed 
trespassing, any information or evidence obtained while trespassing 
would be the fruits of a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.72 
Thus, the evidence could not be the basis for a later search with a 
warrant and would likely be subject to suppression via the 
exclusionary rule.73 If the officers had an implied license to approach 
the house, however, the Fourth Amendment would not be violated 
and any evidence obtained would be admissible.74 In order to conduct 
 
 65. Id. at 410. 
 66. See id. at 404, 410–11 (stating that in a previous case, the Supreme Court held that 
“an officer’s momentary reaching into the interior of a vehicle did constitute a search” 
(citing New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114–15 (1986))). Additionally, the Court in Jones 
noted that the physical intrusion into the car, an “effect” as enumerated in the Fourth 
Amendment, was significant. See id. at 411.  
 67. Id. at 406–07. 
 68. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013). 
 69. Jones, 565 U.S. at 409. 
 70. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417 (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 406). 
 71. United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 992 (10th Cir. 2016). 
 72. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1413, 1417–18 (“That the officers learned what they 
learned only by physically intruding on Jardines’ property to gather evidence is enough to 
establish that a search occurred.”). 
 73. See id. (affirming the Florida Supreme Court’s holding which invalidated a search 
warrant because it was based on information obtained during a previous search that was 
improperly conducted without a warrant). 
 74. See id. at 1416 (explaining that police officers “may approach a home and knock” 
pursuant to an implied license, but that “introducing a trained police dog to explore the 
area around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence” exceeds the scope 
of an implied license). 
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an informed trespass analysis, it is first important to understand the 
mechanics of the implied license. 
B. The Implied License as an Analysis of Social Norms 
Despite stringent Fourth Amendment protection, law 
enforcement officers are sometimes able to collect evidence from an 
individual’s property without it constituting a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment.75 As demonstrated in Carloss, when a 
homeowner explicitly allows officers onto the curtilage or into the 
home, the homeowner has granted the law enforcement officers an 
express license.76 Citizens may revoke this license by either telling 
officers to leave the property or by otherwise unambiguously 
manifesting their intent to revoke the license.77 Accordingly, an 
express license, once given to law enforcement, is relatively simple to 
revoke. 
However, a license can be granted without the express consent of 
a homeowner. Courts have been willing to recognize “implied 
licenses”—notwithstanding the lack of express consent—when the 
context clearly favors doing so.78 An implied license in the real 
property context allows for visitors to approach a home without prior 
express consent from the homeowner.79 In Jardines—the most recent 
Supreme Court case on point—the Court referred to the implied 
license as an invitation based on custom.80 The Court has similarly 
recognized that “the knocker on the front door is treated as an 
invitation or license to attempt an entry .	.	. by solicitors [and other 
 
 75. See 4 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT §	2.3(b)–(f) (4th ed. 2004) (discussing instances wherein law enforcement 
may collect evidence without implicating the Fourth Amendment). 
 76. See Isaac Rank, Recent Development, The Uninvited Guest: The Unexpected 
Damage to Privacy from the Expansion of Implied Licenses, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1354, 1357 
(2016) (“If an [sic] person is invited onto private property, she has an express license to 
enter the property—the same holds true for an officer, who would be permitted to enter 
even without a warrant.”). 
 77. See Charles E. Clark, Licenses in Real Property Law, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 757, 765 
(1921) (“The mere privilege [of a license] may be extinguished—the license revoked—by 
any manifestation by the licensor of his will to that effect.”); see also Kentucky v. King, 563 
U.S. 452, 469–70 (2011) (noting that, without a warrant, police officers are to be treated 
the same as private citizens). 
 78. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–16 (2013). 
 79. See id. at 1415 (discussing the scope of implied licenses). 
 80. See id. at 1421–22 (“[M]embers of the public may lawfully proceed along a 
walkway leading to the front door of a house because	custom grants them a license to do 
so.”). 
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visitors].”81 Based on this implied invitation, visitors and guests may 
approach homes without fear of prosecution for trespass. 
The implied license to enter the premises, though, is not 
absolute. In Jardines, the Supreme Court recognized the limits of an 
implied license.82 In that case, officers without a warrant approached a 
home with a drug-sniffing dog to investigate an unverified tip that 
marijuana was being grown in the home.83 While on the front porch, 
the dog indicated that there were drugs in the house, which the 
officers then used as the basis for obtaining a search warrant.84 Since 
Jardines never manifested any intent to revoke the customary license, 
the issue of signage or barriers was never addressed. Instead, the case 
turned on the scope of the implied license and what is “customary.”85 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that use of the drug-
sniffing dog on the homeowner’s front porch constituted a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.86 Using the trespass analysis he 
articulated in Jones, Justice Scalia reasoned that the employment of a 
specialized dog exceeded the scope of a visitor’s customary invitation 
to enter the premises.87 Importantly, he noted that “[t]he scope of a 
license—express or implied—is limited to a particular area.”88 Based 
on the “customary” nature of the invitation, visitors—including police 
performing knock and talk investigations—generally may not deviate 
from the front path or main routes of entry to a home.89 
Notably, Justice Scalia’s opinion offered some guidance as to 
extent of the license. He explained that the “implicit license typically 
permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock 
promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to 
linger longer) leave.”90 Without the homeowner revoking the license 
in advance, even unwanted visitors, such as door-to-door salesmen or 
 
 81. Id. at 1415 (quoting Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951)). 
 82. See id. at 1416–17. 
 83. Id. at 1413. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See id. at 1416 (explaining that “the background social norms that invite a visitor 
to the front door do not invite him there to conduct a search” and thus concluding that 
“[t]here is not customary invitation” to search around a house with a drug-sniffing dog). 
 86. Id. at 1417 (“That the officers learned what they learned only by physically 
intruding on Jardines’ property to gather evidence is enough to establish that a search 
occurred.”). The decision was largely based on the police officers “purpose to conduct a 
search,” as well as the violation of the scope of the implied license. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1416. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. at 1416 (“[A visitor] marching his bloodhound into the garden before 
saying hello and asking permission, would inspire most of us to—well, call the police.”). 
 90. Id. at 1415. 
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missionaries, are allowed to enter a homeowner’s curtilage—provided 
they abide by the limits recognized by the Court.91 
Routine and custom also limit the actions that visitors may take 
on the curtilage, even if they are on the front path or an otherwise 
permissible location. The actions of a visitor must be within the 
bounds of what is “routine” or consistent with “background social 
norms.”92 Thus, the Court has recognized that the scope of an implied 
license is also “limited	.	.	.	to a specific purpose.”93 Accordingly, a 
visitor may not explore the front path with a metal detector or drug-
sniffing dog, or by any other method falling outside the bounds of 
societal norms.94 
II.  KNOCK AND TALKS AND REVOKING THE LICENSE 
A. The Potency of Knock and Talks 
The implied license to enter a homeowner’s curtilage applies to 
all visitors to a property—wanted and unwanted alike.95 Door-to-door 
salesmen rely on the license to make a living, Girl Scouts use it to sell 
cookies, and police officers use it to conduct investigations. This 
practice, generally referred to as a knock and talk, is commonly used 
across the nation.96 
In theory, the execution of a knock and talk is quite simple. Law 
enforcement officers—without a warrant—approach a home along 
the front path.97 They knock or ring the doorbell in an attempt to 
engage with the homeowner or occupant and may “wait briefly.”98 
The officers may request to question or engage in a conversation with 
the individual.99 The individual is under no obligation to speak with 
the officers and may tell them to leave at any point.100 Absent an 
invitation to linger, the officers must leave promptly.101 The essential 
 
 91. See id. (“Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation .	.	.	is generally 
managed without incident by the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters.”). 
 92. Id. at 1416. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 994 n.4 (10th Cir. 2016). (“There does not 
appear to be any circuit that has concluded, after Jardines, that a knock-and-talk is 
invalid.”). 
 97. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1413; Kentucky v. King 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011). 
 98. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415. 
 99. King, 563 U.S. at 469–70. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415. 
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principle, as stated by the Supreme Court, is that “[w]hen law 
enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a 
door, they [may] do no more than any private citizen might do.”102 
For this analysis, it is important to appreciate that a knock and 
talk is an easy and important tool for law enforcement to use, as it is a 
cheap and effective way to get information. No warrant is required 
and there are minimal judicial mechanisms for oversight to prevent 
targeting.103 However, knock and talks can have significant negative 
ramifications for homeowners, even if they are not engaged in 
criminal conduct. Commentators have noted that the practice often 
leads to a full-fledged search, either through obtaining probable 
cause, the existence of exigent circumstances, or express consent to 
move beyond the scope of the implied license.104 This dynamic is not 
intrinsically bad, as police officers may obtain evidence that prevents 
many others from harm. However, the inherent pressure of police 
interactions with homeowners—especially in the consent context—
may lead to abuses of civil liberties or the targeting of certain 
individuals or groups. 
There is thus considerable concern for citizens who consent to 
searches based on their interactions with police during a knock and 
talk. Evidence suggests that police often “perform ‘knock and talks’ 
for the purpose of getting consent to search.”105 One commentator has 
even gone so far as to say that “it stands to reason that the 
overwhelming majority of ‘consensual’ residential searches are 
preceded by a knock-and-talk,”106 illustrating that knock and talks 
consistently result in consent searches.107 These consent searches are 
very difficult to challenge as courts are very reluctant to invalidate 
these searches, even when coercion is involved.108 Rather, it takes 
 
 102. King, 563 U.S. at 469. 
 103. See Drake, supra note 26, at 26 (arguing that knock and talks allow police officers 
to “circumvent the warrant requirement” and that defendants have been unsuccessful in 
challenging this practice). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Craig M. Bradley, “Knock and Talk” and the Fourth Amendment, 84 IND. L.J. 
1099, 1111 (2009). 
 106. Drake, supra note 26, at 37. 
 107. Id. at 37–38. “[I]n Michigan, a knock-and-talk ends in a consensual search eight to 
ninety percent of the time.” Id. Arkansas has a similar rate and anecdotal evidence from 
Missouri conforms to this view. Id. at 38. 
 108. See Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 
212 (2002); see also United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546, 556 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that 
the “unnerving effect of having numerous officers arrive at one’s door with guns drawn” 
was not sufficient to invalidate the defendant’s consent). 
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“some extreme degree of coercion” in order for a court to invalidate a 
consent search.109 
Recognizing this dynamic, police have increasingly relied upon 
consent to conduct searches when the officers do not have probable 
cause.110 This is concerning, as homeowners may underestimate the 
invasiveness and consequences of a consent search, perhaps agreeing 
to the search in an effort to seem cooperative.111 Further, many 
citizens do not understand that they can refuse when an officer asks 
for consent.112 In this context, knock and talks can be particularly 
troubling. Though officers are “encouraged” to identify themselves as 
police, they are not required to inform homeowners about the limits 
of a knock and talk visit.113 Many residents may be unaware that the 
police, without a warrant, are merely visitors to the home and only 
rely upon the same implied license as the general public.114 Thus, 
police may conduct knock and talks in a targeted manner in the hope 
that the interactions may lead to full-fledged searches. 
Homeowners—especially those not knowing that they do not have to 
interact with police—may feel pressured to appease officers at the 
door. This dynamic erodes the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement, as it cuts out a level of judicial oversight and ultimately 
adds to the danger of knock and talks to homeowners.115 Ultimately, 
this doctrine permits police to utilize knock and talks against persons 
they suspect of wrongdoing, without the objective level of suspicion 
otherwise required by the Fourth Amendment, in the hope of 
 
 109. Strauss, supra note 108, at 212. 
 110. See Drake, supra note 26, at 37 (“The overwhelming majority of police searches 
are justified by the consent exception to the warrant requirement .	.	.	.”); see also 4 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT §	8.2, at 67–68 (5th ed. 2012) (“The police certainly understand that [consent 
searches are unlikely to be deemed invalid], and thus have increasingly come to rely upon 
purported ‘consents’ as the basis upon which wholesale searches are undertaken without 
probable cause and upon no or minimal suspicion.”). 
 111. See, e.g., United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 991 (10th Cir. 2016) (Noting that 
Carloss allowed the officers inside, despite his knowledge that incriminating evidence was 
in the house). 
 112. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 470 (2011). 
 113. Id. at 468. 
 114. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013) (“[A] police officer not armed 
with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is ‘no more than 
any private citizen might do.’” (quoting King, 563 U.S. at 469)). 
 115. See Drake, supra note 26, at 37 (arguing that “police would rather test their 
powers of persuasion on an average citizen than on a neutral and detached magistrate”). 
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obtaining consent—in effect conducting an end-run around the 
warrant requirement.116 
B. Revocation of the Implied License to Protect Against the Overuse 
of Knock and Talks 
Concerns regarding consent notwithstanding, knock and talks 
have consistently been upheld by courts as constitutional.117 As 
previously noted, warrantless knock and talks are predicated on an 
implied license theory.118 As Justice Scalia notes, “a police officer not 
armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely 
because that is ‘no more than any private citizen might do.’”119 This is 
an important point: for the purposes of implied license, police are in 
the same position as private citizens.120 The badge and gun do not 
permit officers to go where they are not invited. Citizens can 
therefore protect themselves from police intrusion onto their 
curtilage by revoking the license to enter the premises.121 This can be 
easily accomplished if the homeowner is present and willing to engage 
with the officers—he or she can simply tell the officers that they may 
not enter the curtilage.122 
The more difficult scenario is when a homeowner is unable, 
unwilling, or not present to tell the officers that they may not enter 
the curtilage. However, courts have held that it is possible to rescind 
an implied license without express revocation.123 According to the 
Tenth Circuit in Carloss, revocation is possible when the actions 
taken by a homeowner convey that an officer or member of the public 
 
 116. See id. at 26 (describing knock and talks as “law enforcement officers 
approach[ing] a targeted residence with a predetermined plan to circumvent the warrant 
requirement”). 
 117. See Bradley, supra note 105, at 1104 (“Only when police have employed 
‘overbearing tactics,’ such as ‘drawn weapons, raised voices, or coercive demands,’ have 
their actions been faulted.” (quoting United States v. Thomas, 430 F.3d 274, 277–78 (6th 
Cir. 2005))); see also United States v. Weston, 443 F.3d 661, 666–67 (8th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1238–39 (10th Cir. 2004); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 
279, 289–90 (4th Cir. 2001); State v. Cochran, 115 S.W.3d 513, 522 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
2003). 
 118. See supra Part I 
 119. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011)). 
 120. See King, 563 U.S. at 469–70. 
 121. Id. at 470. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 994–95 (10th Cir. 2016); State v. Smith, 
__ N.C. App. __, __, 783 S.E.2d 504, 509 (2016); State v. Christensen, No. W2014-00931-
CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 2330185, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2015), aff’d, 517 S.W.3d 
61 (Tenn. 2017), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-321 (U.S. Aug. 31, 2017). 
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“could not go to the front door and knock.”124 Another jurisdiction 
noted that revocation “must be obvious to the casual visitor.”125 Put 
simply, as long as the “homeowner displays ‘clear demonstrations’ of 
his intent [that officers may not enter the curtilage], the license to 
approach the home may be limited or rescinded entirely.”126 
But exactly how is a homeowner supposed to effectively revoke 
the license? Since the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Jardines, 
courts have struggled to articulate what the exact requirements are. 
The courts that have tackled the issue of revocation have been 
reluctant to adopt a bright line rule, instead favoring analyses which 
provide more flexibility for courts to weigh individual 
circumstances.127 
Historically, notice has been the key to revoking a license. In 
Jones, the majority suggested that common law at the time of the 
founding informs the trespass conception of the Fourth 
Amendment.128 In Carloss, then-Judge Gorsuch seems to suggest that 
the trespass test put forth by Justice Scalia is informed by the 
common law at the time of the founding.129 Consequently, the works 
of English common law scholars are informative. For example, 
Blackstone notes that “every entry, therefore, thereon without the 
owner’s leave, and especially if contrary to his express order, is a 
 
 124. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 994–95 (“Whether [an implied license has been revoked] 
depends on the context in which a member of the public, or an officer seeking to conduct a 
knock-and-talk, encountered the signs and the message that those signs would have 
conveyed to an objective officer, or member of the public, under the circumstances.”). 
 125. Christensen, 2015 WL 2330185, at *8. 
 126. Smith, 783 S.E.2d at 509 (citing State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 762, 767 S.E.2d 312, 
319 (2015)). 
 127. See Christensen, 2015 WL 2330185, at *8. In addition to the existence of a physical 
barrier and signs, courts sometimes take into account the general accessibility of the 
property, as well as the set-up of the property and extent of the curtilage. See State v. 
Christensen, 517 S.W.3d 60, 76–77 (Tenn. 2017).  
 128. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (“We have no doubt that 
such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment when it was adopted .	.	.	. [O]ur Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
was tied to common-law trespass, at least until at least the latter half of the 20th 
century.”). Some scholars have pushed back against the notion that the trespass test was 
revived by Justice Scalia. See Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment 
Searches, S. CT. REV. 67, 68–69, 97 (2012) (arguing that there never was a “historical 
trespass era” and that the test is a newer creation). 
 129. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1011 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“First, as a matter of law, [the 
concurrence’s reasoning] disregards the common law rule of decision at the time of the 
founding and its many applications, then and now, suggesting that posted notice can 
suffice to warn off ‘reasonable’ visitors. The Fourth Amendment is, after all, supposed to 
protect the people at least as much now as it did when adopted, its ancient protections still 
in force whatever our current intuitions or preferences might be.”). 
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trespass or transgression.”130 According to Blackstone, notice was 
sufficient to revoke the license—there was no requirement of a 
physical barrier to prevent entry.131 Other evidence further supports 
this notion; for example, one source specifically references warning 
signs, stating that “[n]otice by a board would be sufficient, if it could 
be proved that the defendant had read it.”132 
Despite the historical notion that notice is the key to revocation, 
there is an emerging consensus among the lower courts that the 
placement of a no trespassing sign alone is not enough to effectively 
revoke this license. The Tenth Circuit held in Carloss that “just the 
presence of a ‘No Trespassing’ sign is not alone sufficient to convey to 
an objective officer, or member of the public, that he cannot go to the 
front door and knock.”133 As then-Judge Gorsuch put it, no 
trespassing signs have “become little more than lawn art.”134 This 
notion is supported by decisions from federal district courts in 
Wisconsin135 and Virginia,136 as well as state court decisions from 
Nebraska137 and Tennessee.138 Recently, the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals echoed the Tenth Circuit, noting that “the sign alone	.	.	. was 
 
 130. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *209. 
 131. See id. at *209–10, *214 (“Every trespass is willful where the defendant has notice, 
and is especially forewarned not to come on the land.”). 
 132. EDWARD CHRISTIAN, A TREATISE ON THE GAME LAWS: IN WHICH IT IS FULLY 
PROVED, THAT, EXCEPT IN PARTICULAR CASES, GAME IS NOW, AND HAS ALWAYS 
BEEN, BY THE LAW OF ENGLAND, THE PROPERTY OF THE OCCUPIER OF THE LAND 
UPON WHICH IT IS FOUND AND TAKEN: WITH ALTERATIONS SUGGESTED FOR THE 
IMPROVEMENT OF THE SYSTEM 96 (1821). 
 133. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 995. 
 134. Id. at 1011 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 135. See Davis v. City of Milwaukee, No. 13-CV-982-JPS, 2015 WL 5010459, at *13 
(E.D. Wis. Aug. 21, 2015) (noting that “signs stating ‘Private Property’ or ‘No Trespassing’ 
do not, by themselves, create an impenetrable privacy zone”). 
 136. See United States v. Jones, No. 4:13cr00011-003, 2013 WL 4678229, at *9 (W.D. 
Va. Aug. 30, 2013) (holding that “the existence and volume of ‘No Trespassing’ signs is not 
dispositive”). 
 137. See City of Beatrice v. Meints, 856 N.W.2d 410, 421 (Neb. 2014) (noting, in a 
slightly different context than a knock and talk, that the defendant “could not reasonably 
expect that tacking a ‘no trespassing’ sign to a tree would prevent others from viewing or 
walking on his land”). 
 138. See State v. Christensen, No. W2014-00931-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 2330185, at *8 
(Tenn. Crim. App. May 14, 2015) (finding that because “the [no trespassing] sign in this 
case would not have prevented the casual visitor or the reasonably respectful citizen from 
approaching [the defendant’s] residence” the defendant did not revoke the implied 
license). 
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insufficient to revoke the implied license to approach.”139 The trend 
among decisions seems to favor this view.140 
C. The Current Totality of the Circumstances Approach  
When determining whether or not a homeowner has revoked an 
implied license, most courts purport to apply a totality of the 
circumstances analysis.141 As noted in Carloss, this standard is 
generally based on reasonableness.142 A license is revoked when an 
objective officer or member of the public would, in light of all the 
circumstances, reasonably understand that the license has been 
revoked.143 Put another way, “the revocation must be obvious to the 
casual visitor who wishes only to contact the residents of a 
property.”144 At face value, it seems that under certain circumstances, 
a no trespassing sign could suffice to revoke the license. 
But there is another, unspoken requirement. For effective 
revocation, there generally must be a physical barrier between the 
homeowner and the public—even if the court purports to apply a 
totality of the circumstances test.145 As one judge puts it, there must 
 
 139. State v. Smith, __ N.C. App. __, __, 783 S.E.2d 504, 509 (2016). 
 140. Still, it is important to note that a few courts have pushed back on this conclusion. 
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has been a relative hotbed in support of the 
effectiveness of no trespassing signs. Three cases in that court suggested that no 
trespassing signs revoke the implied invitation to approach. The impact of these cases is 
limited though, because the opinions are unpublished. Further, in two of these cases, the 
discussion of the no trespassing signs came in dicta. See State v. Draper, No. E2011-01047-
CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1895869, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 24, 2012); State v. 
Blackwell, No. E2009-00043-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 454864, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 
10, 2010); State v. Henry, No. W2005-02890-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1094146, at *5 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. Apr. 11, 2007). However, a recent Tennessee Supreme Court case has limited 
the applicability of these cases, as it has directly addressed the matter. See State v. 
Christensen, 517 S.W.3d 60, 75 (Tenn. 2017). 
 141. See, e.g., United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Whether 
that is so depends on the context in which a member of the public, or an officer seeking to 
conduct a knock-and-talk, encountered the signs and the message that those signs would 
have conveyed to an objective officer, or member of the public, under the 
circumstances.”); Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 76. 
 142. See Carloss, 818 F.3d at 994. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Christensen, 2015 WL 2330185, at *8. 
 145. Generally, even multiple, conspicuously-located signs do not revoke licenses. See, 
e.g., Carloss, 818 F.3d at 996–97; United States v. Bearden, 780 F.3d 887, 893 (8th Cir. 
2015); United States v. Holmes, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1263–65 (M.D. Fla. 2015); Davis v. 
City of Milwaukee, No. 13-CV-982-JPS, 2015 WL 5010459, at *10 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 21, 
2015); United States v. Jones, No. 4:13cr00011-003, 2013 WL 4678229, at *5, *9 (W.D. Va. 
Aug. 30, 2013); United States v. Schultz, No. 13-20023, 2013 WL 2352742, at *5 (E.D. 
Mich. May 29, 2013). 
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be “special facts” which erase any ambiguity about revocation.146 
There appear to be no published cases147 in which a homeowner who 
was unwilling or unable to explicitly revoke this privilege successfully 
argued that it was implicitly revoked without some sort of physical 
barrier on the curtilage.148 Moreover, fencing that surrounds curtilage, 
along with locked gates and no trespassing signs, is virtually always 
effective.149 
Though courts do not designate it as an explicit requirement,150 
generally, knock and talks have been invalidated only when a barrier 
is present.151 In effect, courts have created a de facto requirement that 
a home must have a barrier in order to revoke the implied license. 
Thus, the test applied by courts is not a true totality of the 
circumstances analysis. In practice, homeowners will fail the test if 
they do not have a barrier, regardless of other circumstances.152 This 
de facto barrier requirement renders the concept of notice—and thus 
signage—virtually useless. 
It seems likely that the de facto barrier requirement is a holdover 
from the Katz era. Before Justice Scalia developed the trespass 
 
 146. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1000 (Tymkovich, J., concurring). 
 147. There are a few cases which do state that it is possible for a sign to revoke the 
license, but those cases either state that proposition in dicta or questionably rely on state 
trespass statutes to evaluate Fourth Amendment claims. See United States v. Clarkson, 
No. 1:13-cr-44, 2015 WL 328350, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 26, 2015); Powell v. State, 120 So. 
3d 577, 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 148. Unless, of course, the homeowner is present. This analysis operates under the 
assumption that the homeowner is unable or unwilling to engage with the police.  
 149. See Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1000 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (“[A] closed or locked 
gate, especially in the residential context, imparts more information to the reasonable 
observer.”); Brown v. State, 152 So. 3d 619, 623–24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Bainter v. 
State, 135 So. 3d 517, 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014). By contrast, open gates, with or 
without no trespassing signs, are usually not sufficient to revoke the implied license. See, 
e.g., Bearden, 780 F.3d at 894 (citing United States v. Robbins, 682 F.3d 1111, 1115 (8th 
Cir. 2012)). 
 150. One dissenting judge on the Tennessee Supreme Court referenced this 
requirement, noting that signage is not enough to “protect our constitutional rights against 
a warrantless search and that it may take ‘a fence and a closed gate that physically block 
access to the front door of a house’ to revoke the implied license to enter the land around 
a residence.” State v. Christensen, 517 S.W.3d 60, 79 (Tenn. 2017) (Lee, J., dissenting.) 
(quoting majority opinion). 
 151. See United States v. Holmes, 143 F. Supp. 3d 1252, 1262 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (“When 
it comes to knock and talk jurisprudence, courts consider the effectiveness of all the 
barriers to entry to determine whether they serve to revoke the implied license.”); Brown, 
152 So. 3d 623–24; Bainter, 135 So. 3d at 520. 
 152. See Christensen, 2015 WL 2330185, at *8 (holding that actions by homeowner were 
not sufficient to revoke); United States v. Denim, No. 2:13-CR-63, 2013 WL 4591469, at 
*2, *5–6 (E.D. Tenn. 2013) (noting that even six no trespassing signs, among other things, 
do not revoke the implied license). 
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analysis in United States v. Jones, Katz’s reasonable expectations test 
applied to situations when officers entered a homeowner’s 
curtilage.153 Under Katz, signage alone generally could not create an 
expectation of privacy that society was prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.154 Courts generally required a barrier to create a 
legitimate expectation of privacy.155 
The de facto barrier requirement is not faithful to the historical 
conception of revocation of an implied license. As noted above, the 
historical key to revoking an implied license is notice.156 The de facto 
barrier requirement distracts from this key principle and artificially 
raises the burden to revoke a license. Recently, then-Judge Gorsuch 
noted that the common law suggested that “posted notice can suffice 
to warn off ‘reasonable’ visitors.”157 
Modern law also suggests that the barrier requirement does not 
conform to ordinary trespass principles. No trespassing signs have 
been held by some state courts to revoke consent in tort law 
contexts.158 For example, in a non-curtilage context, an “adequately 
placed” warning sign can trigger a tort claim for trespassing when an 
unwelcome visitor thereafter enters the property.159 If a warning sign 
can trigger a trespassing claim in a non-curtilage context, it stands to 
reason that curtilage would be afforded at least similar, if not more, 
 
 153. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013). 
 154. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Validity of Search and Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy as Affected by No Trespassing or Similar Signage, 45 A.L.R. 6th 
643, 658 (2009) (“In most cases involving signs without any other physical object—such as 
a fence or gate—signaling a desire for privacy or exclusion, a ‘no trespassing’ or similar 
sign has been held insufficient to support a protectable privacy interest in both rural and 
suburban and urban environments, and courts have often explained themselves on the 
basis that rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not coterminous with the private 
property interests embodied in the concept of trespass.”). 
 155. See id.; see also 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures §	65 (2017). 
 156. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
 157. United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 1011 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting). Then-Judge Gorsuch had previously noted that “despite the relatively low 
literacy rates in mid-18th century England and early America, there appears to be 
considerable authority suggesting that posted signs or other types of published notice 
could suffice as a matter of law to ward off unwanted visitors.” Id. at 1009. 
 158. See Bonney v. Canadian Nat’l R.R. Co., 613 F. Supp. 997, 1001–02 (D. Me. 1985) 
(noting that due to no trespassing signs members of the public “could not have reasonably 
believed that the railroad consented to such use”); Murphy v. Muskegon Cty., 413 N.W.2d 
73, 77 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (“[T]here was a visible ‘Road Closed’ sign, a ‘Dead-end 
Road’ sign, and a large yellow ‘No Trespassing’ sign .	.	.	. [T]he jury could infer that the 
driving of the motorcycle down this roadway constituted a trespass.”). 
 159. Douglas Hale Gross, Annotation, Liability in Connection with Injury Allegedly 
Caused by Defective Condition of Private Road or Driveway, 44 A.L.R. 3d 355, 376 (1972) 
(noting that “one may not be a trespasser until after he passes an adequately placed 
warning sign” with no mention of a physical barrier requirement). 
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protection due to the enhanced constitutional protection afforded to 
curtilage under the Fourth Amendment. 
By creating the physical barrier requirement, courts have strayed 
from the principles limiting the powers of police in Kentucky v. 
King160 and Florida v. Jardines. In those cases, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that while conducting a warrantless knock and talk, 
police are in the same position as a private citizen vis-à-vis the 
home.161 It thus stands to reason that—under the current regime, for 
better or worse—if a no trespassing sign can revoke an implied license 
for a private citizen, it should do the same for police. 
III.  FORMULATING A SOLUTION 
The present acceptance of both Katz and Jones in the context of 
knock and talks leaves police officers and citizens in a difficult 
position, as neither possesses a true bright-line rule by which to 
evaluate their rights. This ambiguity in the law must be resolved to 
promote both civil liberties and effective policing. Any changes to the 
circumstances in which a license can be revoked will have a major 
impact on police practice, with the practice of knock and talks being 
most affected. In that vein, it is important to note that numerous 
appellate court decisions upholding the practice post-Jardines 
demonstrate that it is still a relevant and valid tool.162 Jardines, with its 
recognition that the scope of an implied license is limited,163 should 
provide a deterrent for unscrupulous officers who use knock and talks 
as a front to conduct a search. Banning the practice altogether, 
though, may hamstring investigators who would be unable to 
approach the homes of witnesses or neighbors without prior express 
consent, a warrant based on probable cause, or an exigent 
circumstance. 
On the other end of the spectrum, it has been suggested that 
police officers should “enjoy an irrevocable right to enter a home’s 
curtilage to conduct a knock and talk.”164 This argument, though, 
opens up potential constitutional issues. Then-Judge Gorsuch’s 
 
 160. 563 U.S. 452 (2011). 
 161. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013); King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 
(2011). 
 162. See, e.g., United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 992 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing United 
States v. Cruz-Mendez, 467 F.3d 1260, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006)). 
 163. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416. 
 164. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1004 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Brief of 
Plaintiff/Appellee at 17, United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988 (10th Cir. 2016) (No. 13-
7082), 2014 WL 1269852, at *17). 
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dissent in Carloss criticizes this assertion by characterizing it as a “sort 
of permanent easement [for law enforcement officers]—whatever the 
homeowner may say or do about it.”165 He went on to state that “[n]o 
trace of some sort of permanent easement belonging to the state (and 
the state alone) can be found in the common law at the founders’ 
time.”166 In other words, this potential solution cannot be reconciled 
with the Fourth Amendment in then-Judge Gorsuch’s view.167 
Instead, the optimal rule regarding implied licenses must be 
faithful to the historical requirement of revocation: notice.168 To 
achieve this, courts should apply an actual totality of the 
circumstances test, considering the objective notice of revocation 
provided by the homeowner. This solution can be easily incorporated 
into contemporary jurisprudence, as courts already purport to employ 
a version of the totality of the circumstances test, asking whether law 
enforcement officers were reasonably put on notice that a 
homeowner had revoked the implied license.169 The application of this 
test is flawed, however, due to the de facto barrier requirement, 
which fails to consider the centrality of notice. While the creation of a 
barrier should certainly be considered, it should not be a prerequisite 
to pass this test. Courts should instead refocus their inquiry into what 
steps the homeowner has taken specifically to revoke the license and 
put objective visitors on notice that they may not approach the home 
without an express invitation. Accordingly, courts must remain 
focused on the key principle: whether the actions taken by the 
homeowner convey revocation of the license. 
Interestingly, a substantial number of state legislatures have 
agreed that signage alone is sufficient to revoke an implied license in 
 
 165. Id. at 1005. In the government’s brief to the Tenth Circuit, the government did not 
cite any sources of authority for this proposition, simply stating “society would likely 
recognize the ‘no trespassing’ signs here as prohibiting drunks, vagrants and the like from 
wandering on the property and loitering. However, society would not endorse the 
proposition that ‘no trespassing’ signs would prohibit postal carriers, FedEx couriers, 
flower delivery persons, the paperboy or the police from approaching the home and 
making contact with the occupant to fulfill the duties of their respective jobs.” Brief of 
Plaintiff/Appellee at 19, United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 992 (10th Cir. 2016) (No. 
13-7082), 2014 WL 1269852, at *19. 
 166. Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1006 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that 
there appeared to be “no colorable authority” in support of this theory. Id. at 1007. 
 167. Despite being the main theory upon which the prosecution’s theory rested, the 
Tenth Circuit did not discuss it at all. The lone dissenter, then-Judge Gorsuch, noted that 
“neither of my colleagues’ opinions even dignifies it with discussion.” Id. at 1007. In this 
vein, then-Judge Gorsuch seems to echo the viewpoint of Justice Scalia.  
 168. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra Section II.C. 
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other contexts.170 Numerous criminal trespass statutes, which do not 
necessarily have a bearing on a court’s Fourth Amendment analysis, 
explicitly recognize that signage can revoke a license.171 Some statutes 
regulate the size or positioning of such signage.172 Others simply note 
that the signs must be posted “in a manner reasonably likely to come 
to the attention of intruders.”173 Additionally, some states do not even 
require warning signs—a mere colored mark is sufficient to provide 
notice.174 These statutes suggest that courts may not be faithfully 
applying trespass law in the knock-and-talk context.175 
This refocusing does not mean that signage would be sufficient to 
revoke an implied license in all circumstances. For example, the 
posting of a small, generic no trespassing sign may not indicate to an 
objective officer or casual visitor a clear intent to revoke the license. 
Placement and size of the sign should be taken into consideration, as 
should the content of the sign.176 The number of signs posted is also a 
 
 170. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §	402 (West, Westlaw through 2017 First 
Reg. Sess. of 128th Legis.) (“A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, knowing that that 
person is not licensed or privileged to do so .	.	. [e]nters any place .	.	. that is posted .	.	.	in a 
manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§	2C:18-3 (West, Westlaw through L.2017, c. 240 & J.R. No. 19) (“A person commits a 
petty disorderly persons offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, 
he enters or remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is given by .	.	. 
[p]osting in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of 
intruders.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. §	30-4-1 (West, Westlaw through First Reg. and Special 
Sess. of 53rd Legis. (2017)) (“Notice of no consent to enter shall be deemed sufficient 
notice to the public and evidence to the courts .	.	.	.”). 
 171. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §	602(l) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) 
(stating that “[e]ntering .	.	. unenclosed lands where signs forbidding trespass are displayed 
at intervals” constitutes misdemeanor trespass). 
 172. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. §	943.13(2)(am)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Act 
118) (“Land is considered to be posted .	.	. [i]f a sign at least 11 inches square is placed in 
at least 2 conspicuous places for every 40 acres to be protected.”). 
 173. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	14-159.13 (2015). 
 174. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §	30.05(b)(2)(D) (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. 
and First Called Sess. of 85th Legis.) (noting that a homeowner may give notice that an 
entry is forbidden by placing vertical purple marks on trees that are “readily visible to any 
person approaching the property”); VA. CODE. ANN. §	18.2-119, 134.1 (West, Westlaw 
through 2017 Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. Ann. §§	943.13–943.15 (West, Westlaw through 2017 
Act 118) (noting that “markings [must be] at least one foot long, including in a contrasting 
color the phrase ‘private land’ and the name of the owner, are made in at least 2 
conspicuous places for every 40 acres to be protected”). 
 175. It is important to note, however, that a violation of state trespass statutes likely 
does not have a direct effect on the Fourth Amendment analysis. See Virginia v. Moore, 
553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (“[S]tate restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment 
protections.”). In other words, even if the police violate a state criminal trespass statute, 
the Fourth Amendment analysis is not necessarily affected because Fourth Amendment 
protections are not linked to state law. See id. 
 176. “No trespassing” conveys a different message than “private property” or “no 
visitors for any reason.” 
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factor that could be considered. A large, conspicuous sign with 
unambiguous language would likely satisfy the totality of the 
circumstances test in most cases.177 
A revitalized totality of the circumstances test is also more 
faithful to common law principles and state statutes. By refocusing on 
the concept of notice by the true totality of circumstances, courts can 
more faithfully scrutinize knock and talk interactions. Further, the 
test would more closely parallel the framework adopted by many 
state legislatures.178 
The recent Tenth Circuit decision in Carloss leaves the door 
open for a refocusing of the test.179 Perhaps most notably, then-Judge 
Gorsuch’s lengthy dissent argues in favor of a less-burdensome 
revocation regime—one that gives more weight to signage and the 
expressions of the homeowner.180 He highlighted the historical angle, 
noting that “[n]othing in [the] common law rule of decision required 
both notice by word (a sign) and notice by deed (a fence).”181 Still, 
Gorsuch recognized that no trespassing signs alone may not always do 
the trick.182 
Even so, as applied to the facts of Carloss, he pointed out that 
the multiple no trespassing signs, despite being small and generic, 
should have given the officers reasonable notice that they were not 
allowed to enter the homeowner’s curtilage.183 
Moreover, the majority opinion in Carloss holds open the 
possibility that signage alone can revoke an implied license. The 
majority opinion largely focuses on the ambiguity of the signage on 
 
 177. A faithful application of the “clear demonstrations” test, State v. Smith, __ N.C. 
App __, __, 783 S.E.2d 504, 510 (2016), should find that a sign can revoke, provided it is 
conspicuous and specific enough. Similarly, if the sign—and its message—is obvious to the 
casual visitor, it should revoke the implied license. 
 178. See supra notes 170–74 and accompanying text. 
 179. Though the door is open, it may be only cracked, as the most recent decision (as 
of this publication) regarding implied license cites Carloss for the proposition that police 
are impliedly invited to the premises “even in the face of signage prohibiting trespassing.” 
Malone v. City of Wynnewood, No. CIV-17-0527-HE, 2017 WL 3671170, at *3 (W.D. 
Okla. Aug. 24, 2017). 
 180. See United States v. Carloss, 818 F.3d 988, 1008–09 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting). 
 181. Id. at 1009. 
 182. See id. at 1011 (“No one suggests that posting a No Trespassing sign ‘begins and 
ends’ the Fourth Amendment inquiry or that a sign will succeed in revoking the implied 
license ‘in every instance.’ I do not doubt, for example, that often enough a No 
Trespassing sign—perhaps because of its distant or obscure placement—will fail to 
provide notice that the implied license to knock on the front door has been revoked.”). 
 183. Id. at 1009. 
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the property, not the lack of a physical barrier.184 Though ultimately 
ruling in favor of the government, the focus of the majority’s opinion 
is essentially the correct one. Indeed, even then-Judge Gorsuch noted 
that the majority is “strongly implying that No Trespassing signs will 
do their job so long as they (1) are placed visibly on the curtilage itself 
and (2) don’t contain surplus language.”185 Consequently, it is possible 
that lower courts will use Carloss as an opportunity to shift away from 
the de facto barrier requirement and towards a true totality of the 
circumstances test. 
Recently, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed this issue.186 
In a three-to-one decision, the court applied the totality of the 
circumstances analysis taken from Carloss.187 Despite multiple no 
trespassing signs, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that the 
homeowner did not revoke the implied license to enter the curtilage 
of the home.188 According to the court, “under the totality of the 
circumstances, the Defendant’s ‘No Trespassing’ signs .	.	. were not 
sufficient to revoke the implied license.”189 By applying this test, one 
scholar noted, the Tennessee Supreme Court clearly does not place 
much stock in no trespassing signs.190 
The lone dissenter on the Tennessee Supreme Court largely 
echoed the concerns raised by then-Judge Gorsuch. Though less 
pointed than Gorsuch’s dissent in Carloss, Justice Sharon Lee 
forcefully argued that signage alone should be sufficient to revoke an 
 
 184. The concurrence seemed to apply the de facto barrier requirement, noting that 
“[n]o special facts—like a fence or other physical obstacle—clarified to the reasonable 
visitor that these signs revoked the license.” Id. at 1000 (Tymkovich, J., concurring). 
 185. Id. at 1014 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 186. See State v. Christensen, 517 S.W.3d 60, 63–64 (Tenn. 2017). 
 187. See id. at 75 (“[U]nder the totality of the circumstances, would an objectively 
reasonable person conclude that entry onto the Defendant’s driveway was categorically 
barred?”). 
 188. Id. at 76–77. The majority also hinted at the existence of the barrier requirement, 
noting that “while a fence and a closed gate that physically block access to the front door 
of a house, in some instances, may be sufficient to revoke the implied license to enter the 
curtilage of a residence, mere ambiguous signage and unkemptness are not.” Id. Indeed 
the lone dissenter also hinted at the barrier requirement’s existence, arguing that the result 
in Christensen is that “only citizens wealthy enough and situated in an area where they can 
‘convert the areas around their homes into the modern equivalent of a medieval fortress’ 
may protect themselves from governmental intrusion and invasion of privacy.” Id. at 84 
(Lee, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Christensen, 953 P.2d 583, 587 (Idaho 1998)). 
 189. Id. at 77 (majority opinion). 
 190. See Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and “No Trespassing” Signs, WASH. POST. 
(Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/04/12
/the-fourth-amendment-and-no-trespassing-signs/?utm_term=.00421a99ad10 [http://perma.cc
/S8HS-W9JA]. 
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implied license.191 In her argument, she referenced both the 
Tennessee statute regarding criminal trespass, as well as the specific 
text of the defendant’s signage.192 Ultimately, however, the other 
justices on the court were not convinced and the totality of the 
circumstances test prevailed.193 It remains to be seen whether future 
courts will take hold of the dissents by then-Judge Gorsuch and 
Tennessee Justice Lee, or whether the totality of the circumstances 
test will apply going forward. 
CONCLUSION 
Revoking an implied license has become very difficult. 
Homeowners are often forced to deal with police approaching their 
home as part of a knock and talk. This practice, while an effective tool 
for law enforcement, can have serious ramifications for homeowners. 
Often, knock and talks can result in invasive searches, either by 
homeowner consent or by probable cause as a result of the 
interaction. 
Citizens wishing to avoid a knock and talk can attempt to revoke 
the basis on which the practice is based—the implied license. Courts, 
however, essentially require a homeowner to construct a physical 
barrier that keeps police and visitors off the premises. Importantly, 
mere signage—no matter how obvious or clear—is not sufficient to 
revoke the license. This de facto barrier requirement distracts and 
detracts from the historical requirement for revocation: notice. 
Courts should carefully consider then-Judge Gorsuch’s dissent in 
United States v. Carloss and move away from the de facto barrier 
requirement. Courts should return to a true totality of the 
circumstances test. While it should remain an important consideration 
in the analysis, the existence of a barrier should not be effectively 
dispositive on the outcome of a case. 
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 191. See Christensen, 517 S.W.3d at 84 (Lee, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s decision that 
multiple ‘No Trespassing’ signs are not sufficient to revoke the implied license for entry 
denies ordinary citizens the protections of the United States and the Tennessee 
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